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This chapter mounts a critique of much of the study of post-Communist political 
culture, suggesting its theoretical development is inadequate and that method has 
substituted for theory.1  The inadequacy of theory is traced to the failure to exploit the 
original interdisciplinarity of the concept.  That characteristic was displayed most 
vividly in a set of divergent conceptualisations and uses that developed in political 
culture research within Communist studies, but these were not themselves adequately 
substantiated theoretically.  Moreover a ‘normalisation’ of study has occurred in the 
currently prevalent mode of political culture research.  The potential of 
interdisciplinary investigations to address the theoretical elaboration of political 
culture is illustrated by a discussion of some work in social psychology. 
The concept of political culture emerged at a time of high confidence in the 
ability of political science to combine broad analytical scope with rigorous method 
(Welch, 1993, pp.72–4).  The concept, accordingly, has a distinctive 
multidisciplinarity at its origins.  But the fragility of the concept’s theoretical 
establishment quickly showed itself in scholarship through a tendency for 
conceptualisations and uses to proliferate and diverge.  In particular, maintaining the 
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link between broad scope and rigorous method has proved a challenge, resulting in a 
series of alternating pronouncements of the death and rebirth of the concept.2 
The concept’s career in Communist and post-Communist studies is distinctive 
within this broad pattern.  The Communist setting brought about a particular set of 
conceptual divergences, which were countered by an argument for ‘disciplinary 
normalisation’ centred on a characteristic method.  A new and distinct phase of 
political culture research was entered with the advent of post-Communism, the 
conditions of which have facilitated a more widespread normalisation of approach, in 
several respects.  The new research setting involves the extension of already 
developed techniques to the newly open territories, and the use of these techniques to 
answer generic questions.3  Whether or not democracy, or the market, has been 
consolidated in the post-Communist area, political science certainly has been.  This 
extension of disciplinary grasp, whereby the mysteries of Kremlinology and the 
interpretivist epistemology of area studies have been replaced by the certainties of 
reliable socio-economic data and representative surveys of popular attitudes, has for 
the most part been welcomed.  This chapter, however, enters a doubt, suggesting that 
the rush to exploit the vast new possibilities for empirical investigation using the 
already highly polished analytical techniques of political science may have 
exacerbated an existing tendency for method to substitute for theory (on that tendency 
in political science see Sartori, 1970). 
The work of Archie Brown triggers the argument of this chapter, in a number 
of ways.  Brown (1977) was a pioneer in the use of this relatively newly coined 
concept in the political analysis of Communist states, a use that subsequently fed back 
into and reinforced the discussion of the concept in the political science ‘mainstream’ 
(as it then was) (Almond, 1983).  At the same time, Brown has also written an 
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important essay (1984a) that has been distinctive in reopening political culture 
research to influences from outside political science, specifically from anthropology 
and social psychology.  Such disciplinary openness is a model for the present chapter. 
But while Brown used this extra-disciplinary foray to defend both a specific 
conceptualisation of political culture and the approach as a whole, in this chapter the 
ultimate aim of theoretical consolidation will be served less directly, by an 
investigation that initially criticises and thus potentially destabilises prevailing usage 
of political culture and opens up other, neglected, possibilities.  The assumption that 
all that remains for political culture research is empirical accumulation is premature; 
further theoretical work is necessary; and some arguments in social psychology not so 
far looked at by students of politics provide material for it: such is the argument of 
this chapter. 
The Origins of Political Culture Research and Its Development in Communist 
Studies 
A genealogy of political culture research has already been provided by its mid-
twentieth century progenitor, Gabriel Almond (1989).  One noteworthy feature is the 
size of the Pantheon of intellectual precursors that Almond claims, which includes 
Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Tocqueville.  This reflects the 
inescapability of the phenomena to which culture-like concepts have responded in 
political science and its predecessors.  It does not, however, help much in specifying 
the concept. 
Only a little more specifically, Almond (1989, pp.10–16) goes on to highlight 
the diverse origins of the political culture concept by describing several disciplinary 
influences: European sociology (mainly Weber, as transmitted via Parsons); social 
psychology (understood as a science of attitudes); and psychoanthropology 
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(especially theories of ‘modal personality’).  But the ‘catalytic agent in the political 
culture conceptualization and research that took place in the 1960s’ (Almond, 1989, 
p.15) was, he says, a development in method: that of the attitude survey.  
This combination of sources, not on the face of it an easy one, expresses the 
intellectual excitement and confidence characteristic of mid-century American 
political science, a mood whose fading Lucian Pye (2003, p.6) has recently lamented.  
In the event, as soon as the early 1960s, with the publication of the first two classic 
studies of political culture, The Civic Culture (Almond and Verba, 1989) and Political 
Culture and Political Development (Pye and Verba, 1965), a tension was evident 
between two applications of the concept (Lane, 1992). 
In the application that would become typical of comparative politics the 
method of statistical correlation and modelling prevailed, making use not only of 
survey-based measurement of political culture but also of quantitative political and 
socio-economic data in order to model causal relationships (if in a rather primitive 
manner at this stage, and not always in a way that facilitated inter-country 
comparison: Welch, 1993, pp.14–22).  In contrast, in the area studies application, 
evidence drawn from political history, religious studies, ethnology and literature was 
deployed in a methodologically eclectic though largely interpretive manner in the 
production of a synoptic view of political culture, presenting considerable 
impediments to systematisation and generalisation.  Thus, in the first major works of 
political culture research, streams in the original disciplinary confluence were 
beginning to separate. 
The insertion of political culture into Communist studies both displayed and 
developed this comparative politics/area studies tension, contributing to the theory of 
political culture through a debate over definition (for fuller discussion see Welch, 
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1987).  Brown (1984b, p.2) defined political culture in ‘subjective’ terms as ‘the 
subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the 
foci of identification and loyalty, and the political knowledge and expectations which 
are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups’.  He took 
the utility of this definition to lie in its potential to reveal dissonance between political 
culture and prevailing political institutions and behaviour, a state of affairs which 
definitions that incorporated patterns of behaviour into political culture itself would 
obscure. 
The positions opposed by this attitude-continuity conceptualisation are of 
three types.4  One opposing view sought (consistently indeed with Brown’s 
incorporation of ‘historical experience’ into his definition)5 to derive a specification 
of political culture from a synoptic interpretation of a country’s history.  Work by 
Tucker (1977), White (1979), Keenan (1986) and Szamuely (1974) is illustrative, 
though not all refer to political culture.  Its key focus is historical continuity.  Brown’s 
view is not however incompatible with the substantive findings of this approach.  
Indeed, for at least one of these writers, White, the more comprehensive definition 
seems largely to be a matter of evidentiary convenience: his theory (White 1984) of 
the means by which political culture is transmitted – via socialisation in family and 
educational institutions – marks an underlying commitment to the attitude-continuity 
position. 
A second opposing position also involves a contribution from Tucker (1973),6 
as well as writers such as Fagen (1969) and Meyer (1972), and draws on arguments in 
cultural anthropology.  This approach stresses the distinctiveness of Communist 
regimes as promoters of cultural revolution.  Analysts argued that such a focus 
demanded a broader definition, not just a broader range of evidence, in order that 
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resocialisation efforts not be seen as, in Fagen’s terms, mere ‘political advertising’ 
(1969, p.6). 
Such arguments pioneer a ‘cultural turn’ that has been widely manifest in 
historical research in the last two decades, notably in the study of the Nazi, the fascist, 
and the Stalinist regimes (however we label them).  Sometimes the term ‘political 
culture’ is employed, sometimes not, as in Falasca-Zamponi’s (1997, p.7) ‘cultural-
political analysis’ of Italian fascism.  In either case, these writers are drawing on the 
creative and aesthetic implications of the concept of culture (Williams, 1981, p.11) in 
their work, just as did earlier students of cultural revolution.  To quote Falasca-
Zamponi (1997, p.4) again: ‘More than mere means of political legitimation, rituals, 
myths, cults, and speeches were fundamental to the construction of fascist power, its 
specific physiognomy, its political vision’.  It always remains relevant to ask about 
the effect and efficacy of such efforts (Confino, 1997), but the supposition of these 
authors is that the question is posed too starkly as a matter of popular acceptance or 
rejection.  Their claim is of a role for official discourse, ritual and mobilisation that is 
in some sense ‘constitutive’ of political culture, rather than (as in the attitude-
continuity position) subject to acceptance or rejection by it. 
A third alternative is perhaps maximally incompatible with Brown’s 
definition.  It arises when we look not at the cultural impact of mass mobilisations, 
mythic discourse and other public interventions but at the structuring of everyday life 
by the regimes, as is invited by Jowitt’s definition of political culture as ‘the set of 
informal, adaptive postures – behavioral and attitudinal – that emerge in response to 
and interact with the set of formal definitions …that characterize a given level of 
society’ (Jowitt, 1992, p.55).  Studies that have operated in this terrain of cultural 
adaptation range from sweeping theories of Communist society such as that of 
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Zinoviev (1985) to more narrowly focused ethnographic work on the use of 
‘connections’ (DiFranceisco and Gitelman, 1984; Ledeneva, 1998) and on hoarding as 
a defensive mechanism in the production apparatus (Swain, 1992, ch. 6; Kenedi, 
1981).  While cultural-revolution approaches focus on the public discursive and 
mobilisational displays that (at least some of the time) characterised the regimes, the 
focus of these cultural-adaptation studies is at a more intimate social level, on the 
‘lifeworld’ of communism. 
Four conceptualisations of political culture can therefore be identified within 
the ‘subjective/comprehensive’ definitional dichotomy.  Firstly, Brown’s attitude-
continuity usage is designed to expose and make researchable one aspect of the 
inauthenticity of the regimes – the failure of their resocialisation (attitude changing) 
efforts.  Secondly, Tucker, White and many others (mainly in the Russian case) 
construe political culture in terms of historical continuity, emphasising one or another 
historical pattern, usually an authoritarian one.  Thirdly, the work of Fagen, Mayer 
and Tucker emphasises the distinctively political-cultural revolutionary agenda of the 
regimes, and the magnitude of the efforts it sometimes involved.  The method here is 
also interpretive, but with discourse, rituals and displays as the interpreted materials.  
Work on cultural adaptation instead focuses on the behaviour and the skills induced 
and inculcated by communism, distant both from the official aims of the regimes and 
from the behaviour that would have occurred in their absence, and thus neither strictly 
authentic nor inauthentic. 
Such rival conceptualisations of political culture take their cue from selected 
empirical observations, but also reflect different uses of the term.  They are not 
subject to straightforward empirical evaluation, as they are intended to direct attention 
to different sets of facts, and implicitly invoke different causal connections.  It is 
  Page 8 
perhaps arguable, in a deconstructive mode, that they should be evaluated politically, 
in view of the extreme political importance, during the Cold War especially, of 
judgements about matters such as the authenticity and inauthenticity of Communist 
regimes.7  But in this chapter a reconstructive rather than a deconstructive course is 
followed. 
Its cue is Brown’s reach into social psychology for support for his 
conceptualisation of political culture.  For example, he derived from the substantial 
literature on ‘cognitive dissonance’ the finding that attitude change is more likely to 
be brought about among active Communist proselytisers (Brown, 1984a, p.158), but 
also from the literature on ‘reactance’ that highly visible coercion tends to produce the 
reinforcement of the repressed attitude (Brown, 1984a, p.166).  Resources such as 
this, even though Brown admits that the findings he cites are not always so 
counterintuitive as to need the confirmation of social psychology (Brown, 1984a, 
p.158), offer theoretical reinforcement by substantiating the psychological processes 
on which a subjective definition of political culture implicitly relies.  But though the 
term ‘psychological’ has sometimes been reserved, by critics as well as supporters, for 
Brown’s and similar definitions, it is clear that the alternative conceptualisations we 
have considered also contain an implicit psychology.  One of their great weaknesses is 
that it has remained implicit.  It is hard, for example, to know exactly what is meant 
by the ‘constitutive’ role of public political discourse, or how ‘adaptation’ works as a 
psychological process.  With Brown’s chapter as our model, we might hope for at 
least equal illumination from a cross-disciplinary foray that keeps these questions in 
mind. 
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Political Culture Research and Post-Communism 
The collapse of Communism in Europe brought greater potential for the disciplinary 
normalisation that Brown’s definitional argument had promoted.  This was so for two 
reasons.  The first was the possibility of using the method Almond had cited as the 
key catalyst for political culture research in the mainstream, the attitude survey.  Its 
use under Communism, while not unknown, had certainly faced serious impediments.  
The other was the framing of post-Communist studies around the problem of 
democratisation, a generic problem whose posing suggested the possibility of 
subsuming post-Communist studies under the subdiscipline of ‘transitology’.  
Together, these considerations amount to the abandonment of an area-studies 
approach to post-Communist political culture and the adoption of a comparative 
politics one.  One cost of this has been the marginalisation of the alternative 
conceptualisations of political culture discussed in the preceding section. 
The literature of empirical political culture research in post-Communist 
studies is now substantial.  Critical reviews of this literature have already appeared 
(Fleron, 1996, Alexander, 2000, pp.45–67), and only some general points will be 
noted here.  The survey method has produced somewhat ambiguous results 
concerning the question of political-cultural foundations of democratisation.  Early 
writings expressed an optimistic view that political culture in former Communist 
states did not present a significant impediment to democratisation.  Some later work 
has challenged this view, and in the course of attempts to resolve these disagreements 
there has been much discussion, some of it of a quite technical nature (for example 
Barrington and Herron, 2001, which criticises the use of multiple regression analysis), 
about the interpretation of survey findings.  Survey research practitioners have 
occasionally voiced concerns about the problematic nature of the post-Communist 
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contexts for the actual conduct of survey research, referring not just to problems of 
training and communication but also of an exacerbation of distorting ‘response 
effects’ (Swafford, 1992). 
James Alexander (2000) makes a broader argument that ‘cultural 
formlessness’ is the main characteristic of post-Communist political culture, a 
condition that he takes to invalidate the attempt to measure political culture using 
surveys.  Instead, he undertakes ‘ethnographic’ investigation (though not perhaps of a 
type that many anthropologists would recognise) based on in-depth interviews.  The 
results he produces are, however, not strikingly different in form from what might be 
obtained by survey methods: he finds that his respondents fall into four types based on 
differences in their largely verbal reactions to the post-Communist environment.  It is 
by no means clear why surveys should be thought less adequate in circumstances of 
cultural formlessness so long as stable groups of respondents can nevertheless be 
identified.  Perhaps, indeed, the ‘snapshot’ characteristic often noticed and criticised 
in surveys (other than panel surveys) would be especially appropriate to this situation.  
A different indicator of political cultural formlessness comes from surveys themselves 
– in particular the high incidence of ‘don’t know’ responses in them.  Ellen 
Carnaghan (1996), using quantitative methods, has suggested that these responses 
reflect apathy, though without providing much guidance as to its roots. 
A less sweeping scepticism about survey methods has been expressed by 
Frederick Fleron (1996).  His review of the specific findings of survey-based studies 
of post-Communist political culture suggests that  ‘there has been little effort to 
examine the effects of timing and the wording of questions on survey results or the 
motives of citizens who express positive affect toward democratic values’ (1996, 
p.234).  Moreover, differences among and relationships between ‘orientations, 
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attitudes, values, beliefs and norms’ receive only ‘scant attention’ in the research 
Fleron (1996, p.236) reviews. 
It is not only in the field of post-Communist studies that objections have been 
made to the use of surveys to measure subjective phenomena.  The theory of survey 
research itself has developed a large literature diagnosing problems such as question-
wording and priming effects.  Some critics and practitioners see these as setting limits 
to the ‘science’ of attitude surveying (Roper, 1983), others as providing scope for 
further scientific study and attempts to bypass the problems (Schuman and Presser, 
1996; Zaller and Feldman, 1992).  The survey situation itself has been examined for 
the presence of complex kinds of communication, familiar to researchers but not 
capable of being represented in survey results, such as ‘rebelliousness, cynicism, 
outrage, intimidation, lies, shyness, hints, metaphors, bragging, hostility, sexual 
advances …’ – examined, in other words, as a conversation that masquerades as a 
scientific measurement (Eliasoph, 1990, p.470). 
Perhaps most fundamental for our present discussion is the question of 
whether political culture should be measured using the same instruments with which 
we measure public opinion.  A caution has been entered by David Laitin, who 
suggests in support of ethnographic methods in political culture research that people 
‘are not fully conscious of the sources of their visions and, even if honest, would not 
necessarily provide the relevant data to survey researchers’ (Laitin and Wildavsky, 
1988, p.592).  Nevertheless, the practice is a feature of the disciplinary normalisation 
of post-Communist studies.  It has been explicitly endorsed for instance by Matthew 
Wyman (1997, p.123): ‘to reject such evidence is to reject the only method we have 
that can get remotely close to representative data on political cultural attitudes’.8  This 
sounds suspiciously like letting our methods dictate our concepts – something 
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complained of by Sartori (1970, p.1038), who emphasised that ‘concept formation 
stands prior to quantification’. 
In post-Communist studies, factors of normalisation such as the new capability 
to conduct attitude surveys and the insistent problem of democratisation, together 
rendering post-Communist studies a scarcely distinctive branch of comparative 
politics, have combined to produce a political culture research programme that is 
methodologically sophisticated but conceptually weak.  In the political culture 
research of Communism, a diversity subsisted not only of definitions but also of uses 
of political culture (with Brown representing the comparative politics mainstream but 
somewhat isolated in his own subfield: 1984b, p.3).  But in post-Communist political 
culture research a conceptual contraction has occurred.  We can certainly obtain more 
information of the type yielded by surveys; but this need not mean better knowledge. 
Considering that political culture research makes a number of psychological 
assumptions (possibly disparate and seldom explicit), it is surprising that its interest in 
social psychology has been so limited.  The perils of extradisciplinary forays 
notwithstanding, the next section investigates the possibility that social psychology 
offers resources for the reconstruction of political culture theory. 
Social Psychology: Attitudes, Skills and Discourse 
Although a definition of political culture that operationalises it via the attitude survey 
method has sometimes been called ‘psychological’, it is clear that all 
conceptualisations of political culture must in some way invoke psychology.  
Invoking ‘attitudes’ is indeed reason enough for paying attention to social 
psychology, given that that discipline has often been understood as the science of 
attitudes (see for instance Allport, 1973, p.19), as it was by Almond.  But what does it 
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mean to say that political culture is at least in part a psychological phenomenon?  
What, indeed, is psychology’s conception of an attitude?  Even a brief investigation of 
social-psychological literature reveals that these are by no means settled questions. 
A comprehensive study in the history of ideas by Donald Fleming (1967) 
traces the evolution of the concept of attitude to its current prominence in the human 
self-image.  From an original meaning having to do with physical posture (even 
imposture), the concept was developed in the nineteenth century, under the influence 
of a radical materialism, in a physiological direction, as a state of physical readiness 
for action.  But, as the need for materialism to proclaim itself so virulently against 
religious doctrine diminished, it became possible to consider mental as well as motor 
aspects of the term; aspects which eventually prevailed.  With Thomas and 
Znaniecki’s (1958; orig. publ. 1918–20) study of the adaptation of Polish immigrants 
to American life as a major influence, attitudes came to be seen as relatively enduring 
mental predispositions to act.  A final major development occurred when ‘opinion’ 
became separated from attitude under the influence of Gallup’s opinion polling.  As 
opinion ‘became the natural term for any preference that was consciously avowed and 
correspondingly easy to tabulate’ (Fleming, 1967, p.349), attitude moved into a 
complementary niche by acquiring a connotation of depth – presumably not 
consciously avowed and less easy to tabulate. 
It is at this point that the concept of attitude entered into political culture 
theory, with a connotation of depth that made it complementary to public opinion, but 
with no further conceptual specification and in association with a method – the 
attitude survey – that seemed to make the empirical determination of attitudes 
straightforward and was bound to lead to the assimilation of political culture to public 
opinion.9  In this setting, its conceptual development pretty much stopped, to be 
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replaced by progressive methodological refinement.  The same was not, however, true 
in its original home of social psychology, where conceptual debate, influenced by 
experiment, has remained very much alive.  In several lines of research, a strongly 
sceptical analysis of attitudes has developed 
The behaviourist tendency in psychology, with its programme of the 
elimination from science of mental phenomena, did not succeed in removing attitudes 
from social psychological study (DeFleur and Westie, 1963, p.19), or indeed in 
retaining dominance in psychology.  Nevertheless, the problem of the inaccessibility 
of attitudes continues to provoke theoretical responses.  An important one was set out 
by Daryl Bem (1972) as the self-perception paradigm, which offered a new 
interpretation of the results observed in the literature on cognitive dissonance. 
A key example of cognitive-dissonance research is the widely cited finding 
(Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) that subjects’ attitudes are modified in order to bring 
them in line with attitude-inconsistent behaviour induced by the experimenter.  
Specifically, when the experimental inducement to perform a previously derogated 
task is large, say $20, no change in the evaluation of the task is produced; when the 
inducement is smaller, say $1, presumably not a convincing reason for the induced 
behaviour, evaluations change to compensate.  Bem (1972, p.50) noticed that 
subsequent behaviour changed more reliably than reported attitudes, suggesting that 
attitude reports are themselves an inference from behaviour, and not a wholly reliable 
one.  Bem’s self-perception theory thus proposes that ‘the individual is functionally in 
the same position as an outside observer’ when seeking to describe ‘attitudes, 
emotions, and other internal states’ (1972, p.2). 
A different view of cognitive dissonance findings, but with similar negative 
implications for an introspectivist account of attitudes, is that attitude reports – such 
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as those eventuating from cognitive dissonance experiments – derive from concerns 
for self-presentation (Baumeister, 1982, pp.11–12) or impression management 
(Tedeschi et al., 1971; see also Gecas, 1982, pp.20–1).  In this theory, which also has 
its own experimental support, the subject responds in order to convey an impression 
of rationality and consistency and avoid conveying one of hypocrisy or gullibility. 
While the thrust of these critiques may appear to be a pronounced scepticism 
about attitudes – compatible, at least in Bem’s case as a ‘sometime radical 
behaviorist’ (Bem, 1972, p.49), with doubt that attitudes even exist or have casual 
efficacy – they actually substantiate a less drastic but still significant conclusion: that 
what we can learn about attitudes from people’s reports about them is limited.  This 
has been the theme of another line of research that was stimulated by some of Bem’s 
findings, Timothy Wilson’s theory of dual attitudes. 
The original essay, by Nisbett and Wilson (1977), reviewed experimental 
literature in both cognitive dissonance and self-presentation theories.  The results, 
they concluded, ‘confound any assumption that conscious, verbal, cognitive processes 
result in conscious, verbalisable changes in evaluations or motive states which then 
mediate changed behavior’ (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977, p.235).  Wilson has developed 
this line of argument into the view that motivations for behaviour and the 
‘explanatory system’ are psychologically distinct (Wilson et al., 1981).  The existence 
of two distinct mental systems, one that is ‘conscious and attempts to verbalize, 
communicate, and explain mental states’ and another that mediates behaviour but is 
inaccessible (Wilson, 1985, p.16), has troublesome implications for conventional 
social psychological methods: ‘It is even more difficult to investigate cognitive 
processes than generally believed’ (Wilson, 1985, p.30).  Wilson has discussed the 
implications for survey research (Wilson et al., 1990, 1996).  Asking respondents to 
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provide reasons for their attitudes can have the effect of changing the attitudes 
reported, with the original attitude sometimes resurfacing later.  For instance, highly 
analysed purchasing decisions prove to be more often regretted later than spur-of-the-
moment ones (Wilson et al., 1990, p.213).  ‘By including only explicit measures of 
attitudes’, Wilson et al. (2000, p.120) conclude, ‘the vast literature on attitude change 
may have overestimated the extent to which change takes place.  People may maintain 
implicit attitudes that continue to influence their behavior.’  Proffered reasons, Wilson 
et al. suggest, are ‘often a function of shared cultural theories about why people feel 
the way they do’ (Wilson et al., 1996, p.95).  The theory of ‘dual attitudes’ has 
become bolder in Wilson’s recent work (Wilson, 2002; Wilson and Dunn, 2004), 
where he has made an effort to rehabilitate for social psychology the idea of the 
unconscious.  The unconscious now refers, for Wilson, not to the psychodynamic 
mechanisms described by Freud (nor to the ‘subliminal effects’ also discredited by 
psychologists: Wilson et al., 1998), but simply to the inaccessible psychological 
sources of behaviour.10 
The thesis that the psychological sources of behaviour are inaccessible 
‘implicit attitudes’ supports the supposition of the psychological depth of political 
culture while at the same time making problematic the empirical grasp of political 
culture via surveys.  A clue as to how, alternatively, empirical grasp may be had 
comes from illustrative reference by Wilson and Dunn (2004, p.500) to recent work 
on motor learning and perceptual skills.  This work has given experimental support to 
speculative philosophical arguments made by Michael Polanyi (1962, pp. 49–57) on 
the phenomenon of skill, namely the irreducibility of skills to explicit rules, and the 
disruption of the exercise of them by conscious reflection or monitoring.  Implicit 
  Page 17 
attitudes may work in the same way, and thus be accessible to study not via verbal 
reports but ethnographically, in the observation of skilful practice. 
Cultural psychology has explored this kind of phenomenon cross-culturally, 
with interesting results.  This sub-discipline emerged as a set of findings of difference 
and difficulty in the application of standard psychometric tests to non-Western 
populations.  As this line of research progressed beyond critique to the development 
of its own positive agenda, it has moved, according to a review by Rogoff and 
Chavajay (1995), in new directions ‘that involved testing cognitive skills that were 
seen as representing important skills tied to cultural practices rather than skills that 
were usually assumed to be general’ (Rogoff and Chavajay, 1995, p.863; see also 
Lehman et al., 2004, pp.695–7).  One striking example is that ‘Japanese abacus 
experts show specific but powerful consequences of their skill in the use of the abacus 
as a tool for mathematical operations’ (Rogoff and Chavajay, 1995, p.865), such as 
increased capacity to remember number sequences. 
Different implications for political culture research arise from the view, 
present from the origins of the dual attitude theory, that the source of subjects’ reports 
of their attitudes is prevailing explicit cultural rules or implicit cultural theories.  It is 
intriguing that social psychology, itself an obvious if seldom exploited source for 
developing the psychological basis of political culture, also finds it necessary to 
invoke an unanalysed ‘cultural background’ in its investigation of attitudes.  
However, other branches of social psychology have been less reticent in the analysis 
of this context, in some cases guided by a programmatic intention to make social 
psychology more ‘social’. 
One such body of work is that on social representations.  Taking a cue from 
Durkheim’s concept of ‘collective representations’, Serge Moscovici and associates 
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(Moscovici, 2000; Farr and Moscovici, 1984) have developed an approach that 
eschews laboratory studies and mainly takes the form of case studies of the 
emergence and spread through society of classifications and theories such as those of 
Freudian psychoanalysis.  They constitute socially accepted common-sense ways of 
explaining phenomena, typically arising in scientific work but becoming generalised 
(in Moscovici’s view) through conversational transmission, initially by being grasped 
in relation to an existing social representation. Moscovici gives the example of 
psychoanalysis being initially understood in terms of religious confession, whereas 
later in its career the social representation of the analyst’s role could be used to 
elucidate that of the confessor (Moscovici, 1984, p.26). 
Somewhat related too has been the theory of ‘cultural epidemiology’ advanced 
recently by Dan Sperber (1985, 1996).  Sperber is keen to revive disciplinary 
exchange between anthropology and psychology, dismissing fears, which have 
inhibited such exchange, that one discipline might be reduced to the other.  Such 
reduction, he points out rather usefully for our present discussion, can happen to 
individual theories, but not to whole disciplines.  Also construing culture as 
‘representations’ (though without reference to the social representations literature), 
Sperber draws on the example of epidemiology to suggest that a theory of culture 
needs to concern itself both with what is spread (psychological phenomena) and the 
dynamics of that spreading, which will differ among representations as it does for 
different diseases and will involve objective conditions such as the physical mode of 
representation (that is, the communications media).  This view, in some ways a 
generalisation of Moscovici and his followers’ case studies, can form the basis of an 
attempt to account for what frames and cultural recipes are available for the processes 
described by psychologists such as Wilson. 
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In terms of political culture research, what these arguments invite is a focus on 
discourse, and particularly on the way that local discourse and behavioural accounting 
draws upon a culturally available set of meanings whose origins may be obscurely 
intellectual.  ‘Toolkit’ or ‘repertoire’ theories have been proposed by sociologists in 
the analysis of culture (Swidler, 1986; Archer, 1988), but with little psychological 
substantiation.  Sources for such theoretical elaboration can be found in the work of 
Moscovici and Sperber, which goes beyond the mere listing of culturally available 
representations to the analysis of their passage through society. 
This section has provided a highly selective review of some lines of research 
in social psychology which have implications for political culture research.  The 
discovery of ‘psychologically deep’ causes of behaviour via surveys, a somewhat 
contradictory enterprise to begin with, is shown to be problematic by findings 
produced in the ‘dual attitudes’ theory of Wilson and colleagues.  The findings show 
that there may indeed be psychologically deep sources of behaviour, but that their 
verbalisability is limited.  The behaviour they give rise to may better be understood 
using the model of skilful practice, which is itself far from unobservable.  Skills, 
moreover, show features relevant to the specification of political culture: variability 
across space and persistence in time.  Ethnographic observation of cultural adaptation 
is supported by these social psychological insights. 
A different source exists for explicit attitudes – attitudes that are reported by 
subjects as reasons for their behaviour and apparent to them on introspection.  Such 
attitudes invoke prevailing cultural repertoires, the study of which (their origin, 
transmission and distribution) has been the subject of social representations research 
in social psychology.  Research of this kind offers the possibility of psychological 
substantiation of the otherwise rather mysterious idea of the constitution of political 
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culture by public discourse and display.  Political culture research, especially in its 
cultural-revolution variant, has paid much attention to public discourse but has tended 
to address the question of constitution by definitional fiat. 
There are, then, suggestive connections between work in social psychology 
and the alternative conceptualisations of political culture that emerged in the area 
studies mode of Communist studies.  In the next section these connections are 
developed in the context of post-Communist political culture research. 
Political Culture Theory and Post-Communism 
The study of political culture in the post-Communist setting has undergone a process 
of disciplinary normalisation.  Three aspects of this have been alluded to.  In the first 
place and most obviously, the capacity to administer attitude surveys has been widely 
exploited, generating a large body of literature that, unlike much of the political 
culture research undertaken in the Communist period, closely resembles the 
mainstream of empirical political science literature on political culture.  A new 
empirical bounty has become available, rather like the newly accessible archives 
whose use has had such an impact on the historiography of Communist states.  As in 
the case of archival research, however, any notion that these new resources would 
now make the facts clear and indisputable has turned out to be too simple. 
Secondly, the political culture research of post-Communism has been largely 
subsumed under the rubric of the problem of democratisation.  This has led to debates 
about the relevance of a mainstream transitology literature to the post-Communist 
cases (Bunce, 1995), but in political culture research its effect has been a largely 
undisputed importation of assumptions about the cultural prerequisites of democracy.  
There are some widely accepted standard accounts of these prerequisites (Linz and 
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Stepan, 1996).  Indeed, such is the degree of standardisation that political scientists 
have become accustomed to ‘outsourcing’ the production of relevant data to 
organisations such as Freedom House and Transparency International.  Arguments 
about the meaning of democracy are thereby sidelined, as they have been in much of 
the ‘empirical theory of democracy’ (Bay, 1965; Skinner, 1973; Ricci, 1984), and the 
same has become true of political culture in the face of this pressure to provide 
answers.  The chief merit of political culture research may, however, not be in 
answering the important but possibly too difficult question of how democracy may be 
consolidated, but rather illuminating what forms democracy may take (Sullivan and 
Transue, 1999).  For this purpose a greater openness to conceptual revision would be 
an advantage rather than a threat. 
Thirdly, in consequence, post-Communist studies has had less of the character 
of area studies – eclecticism, multidisciplinarity and interpretivism.  Indeed area 
studies in general has come under simultaneous pressure from ‘rationalist-scientific’ 
and ‘cultural-humanistic’ standpoints, targeting respectively its contextual 
interpretivism and its supposed cultural essentialism (Katzenstein, 2001, p.790).  The 
merits and demerits of this transformation have been debated in general terms in the 
post-Communist field (King, 1994), but in post-Communist political culture research 
its effect has been one of theoretical simplification, excluding the alternative 
conceptualisations which were briefly explored above in connection with Communist 
studies.  These are nowadays largely seen as unfortunate symptoms of the former 
scarcity of data. 
In response to such developments may be set the implications of the extra-
disciplinary investigations of the preceding section.  The negative implications are 
easiest to see.  Social psychology’s study of attitudes suggests care in the 
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interpretation of survey data as a record of mental contents.  The possibility of limited 
access to attitudes, of a dual system of attitudes, and of the attitude-changing effects 
of asking about reasons are all products of Wilson’s line of research, but are 
suggested by some quite different lines also.  Wilson expressly draws conclusions for 
the conduct of surveys, as we have seen.  In general, the idea of surveys as an 
unimpeachable empirical record of what people think cannot be sustained.  This is far 
from rendering them useless, but it does suggest the desirability of paying more 
attention to the evidently complex psychological processes of which survey responses 
are the result.  While, as already noted, we always want to ask what the people ‘really 
think’ about the mobilisations they are swept into, or the ideological, aesthetic and 
myth-making discourse to which they are exposed, the difficulty of doing this may be 
more than a matter of the permissibility (and costs) of survey research.  Political 
culture research cannot afford to continue to ignore social psychological thinking 
about attitudes in developing a research programme that rests methodologically on 
some evidently simplistic assumptions about that concept. 
Studies that eschew the use of surveys do not by virtue of that necessarily rest 
on firmer psychological foundations.  Alexander’s arguments in Political Culture in 
Post-Communist Russia (2000), for instance, are based on longer and in-depth 
interviews, but his results do not give a great deal of insight into psychological 
processes (they can be both compared and contrasted with the pioneering work of 
Robert Lane (1962) in this respect).  Alexander’s thesis of ‘cultural formlessness’, 
derived from the arguments of Harry Eckstein (1988), is provocative but certainly 
under-specified in psychological terms.  Given Eckstein’s somewhat functionalist 
arguments about the economising advantages of cultural predispositions (1988, 
pp.791–2), it is also questionable how long a condition of cultural formlessness could 
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be expected to endure.  Failing to get a clear view of political culture from surveys 
might be a result not of formlessness, but of the deeper-lying problems of 
conceptualisation that the ‘dual attitude’ theory highlights.  Formlessness is perhaps a 
premature substantive inference from a methodological deficiency. 
Nicolai Petro’s The Rebirth of Russian Democracy (1995), despite its rather 
sweeping dismissal of previous work on Russian political culture, is readily 
assimilated to the interpretive historical-continuity approach of authors such as White 
and Tucker.  Petro presents a historical survey of an ‘alternative’ political culture – 
alternative, that is, to a stress on the underdevelopment of democratic traditions in 
Russia.  It is in fact discourses that he surveys: manifestoes, proposed constitutions 
and Slavophile philosophy are his materials (making Szamuely, 1974, also largely a 
study in political thought, the closest analogue in the Communist studies literature).  
Petro’s study usefully expands our view of the prevailing cultural repertoire, as 
expressed in elite and dissident discourse.  But it suffers, as other studies of this type 
have, from a failure to trace the connections that would justify counting these 
discursive elements as part of political culture.  Especially in view of the historical 
distance or (in Soviet times) the repression and isolation of this discourse, questions 
arise as to what extent it can form part of the culturally available basis of explicit 
political attitudes on the part of the population as a whole – and if it does, how that 
connection has been effected. 
In The Political Culture of the Russian ‘Democrats’ (2000), Alexander Lukin 
deploys a method that, in contrast, clearly reveals the connections between culturally 
available elite discourse and explicit attitudinal responses.  Such connections are 
indeed the book’s topic.  The achievement is, to be sure, easier in a study whose 
historical coverage is a mere six years (1985–91).  Lukin’s findings are derived 
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largely from interviews, and his focus in these interviews has included not just 
explicit attitudes but life histories that have enabled the connections between pubic 
discourse and private attitude to be exposed.  Lukin’s study is narrow in social scope 
too.  His ‘democrats’ are a tiny fraction of the population, and his study does nothing 
to back up its concluding observation that ‘the “democratic” belief system of Soviet 
Russia profoundly influenced the broader political culture of the new Russia’ (Lukin, 
2000, p.299). 
The focus of Kathleen Smith’s Mythmaking in the New Russia (2002) is very 
much on the public aspect of political culture (not a term she uses), in the fashion of 
the cultural-revolution approach in Communist studies and in recent studies of 
political aesthetics such as Falsca-Zamponi’s.  Her topic is the attempt by post-Soviet 
leaders in Russia to construct powerful and evocative public symbols of their regime.  
In contrast with Petro’s account of a resurgent but democratic Slavophilism and 
Orthodoxy, Smith gives a more differentiated picture of the capacity to evoke a strong 
response of the symbols ‘proffered’ (2002, p.8) to the population.  Combining 
democratic and reformist themes with nationalist symbolism has proved difficult: the 
problem is both the resistance of the recent historical materials to a heroic treatment 
and the lack of commitment to mythmaking on the part of post-Soviet leaders. 
Contrasting with these studies of the public and discursive aspects of political 
culture is the work of Alena Ledeneva in Russia’s Economy of Favours (1998).  Like 
Lukin’s study, Ledeneva’s relies on interviews, but focusing in this case not on 
reported political attitudes but on skills and practices.  It illustrates the phenomenon of 
cultural adaptation.  It also displays psychological insight in noting how the use of 
‘blat’ in the Soviet Union evoked feelings of guilt and denial that contribute to 
difficulties in speaking about it as well as lubricating its actual operation.  Blat was 
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systematically misrecognised by participants (Ledeneva, 1998, pp.59–72), who had a 
variety of explicit attitudes towards it (rationalizations, denials, mitigations); 
nevertheless it occurred pervasively.  The skills that it involved may be expected to 
persist as adaptations into the post-Soviet period.   
A study with a focus more readily aligned with the interests of normal political 
science (particularly its recent preoccupation with social capital as a prerequisite of 
democracy) is Marc Morjé Howard’s (2003) study of post-Communist civil society, 
The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe.  The principal method of 
this study is the quantitative assessment of levels of participation, derived from 
surveys enumerating individual membership of communal organizations.  As a 
supplementary method, in-depth interviews seek to show how these patterns relate to 
individual experiences in the Communist lifeworld.  The finding is a distinctively low 
level of communal participation in both Russia and eastern Germany, a legacy, 
Howard argues, of the radical separation between public and private that was an 
adaptation to the Communist setting.  This adaptation has persisted, despite what 
theorists consider to be its inappropriateness in the democratic setting, because 
nothing has happened to require its significant alteration.  In effect, it still works.  
Howard (2003, p.150) concludes: ‘the weakness of civil society [is] a distinctive 
element of post-communist democracy, a pattern that may well persist throughout the 
region for at least several decades’.  We have here a proposal regarding political-
cultural continuity that eschews reference to attitudes and thus need not take a 
position on the authenticity or otherwise of communist regimes.  Practice itself does 
much of the explanatory work. 
As this brief review of some recent literature has shown, social psychological 
doubts about the attitude survey method of political culture research do not justify 
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blanket endorsement of approaches that use other methods.  The purpose of this 
chapter’s exploration of social psychology was indeed in part to question the prestige 
attaching to the attitude survey method in the context of disciplinary normalisation, 
but it was also to explore what social psychology might offer for the theoretical 
consolidation of alternatives.  Taking this purpose seriously also involves noting 
critical implications for the alternatives. 
We have found a basis in social psychology, which to be sure is in need of 
much further exploration, for looking beyond survey responses to a dual manifestation 
of political culture, in the public realm as a constitutive background and in the realm 
of local and social practice as a set of implicit skills and adaptations.  Much needed 
theoretical support is thereby provided for approaches to political culture that might 
have seemed consigned to the disciplinary dustbin; ironically derived precisely from 
looking closely at attitudes, the mainstay of the attitude survey method in the 
comparative politics mode of political culture research  On the other hand, the 
synoptic interpretive sweep of the historical-continuity approach to political culture is 
less well supported.  The fundamental problem here is the ambiguous category of 
‘historical experience’.  It is in need of considerable psychological unpacking.  
Narrowing the historical materials to patterns or traditions of discourse in the fashion 
of Petro (and of Szamuely) does not go very far towards making visible the 
psychological processes that may be involved.  In particular, whether historically 
distant discursive or symbolic elements persist, psychologically (via family 
socialisation perhaps) or are instead rediscovered in politically propitious 
circumstances remains unaddressed in most examples of the historical-continuity 
approach.  For the other alternative approaches, too, theoretical reconstruction 
remains an ongoing task.  Only its barest outlines, involving a dualistic 
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conceptualisation of political culture relating it to public discourse and to local social 
practice, have been provided here.  How far these can be developed remains to be 
seen. 
Interdisciplinary work is harder and harder to achieve, not only because of the 
disciplinary normalisation that has been a particular feature of post-Communist 
studies, but because in general specialisation within political science is becoming ever 
more intense, producing in some cases theoretical consolidation by default.  Political 
culture research originated in an ambitious reach beyond the existing limits of 
political science.  But aside from Brown’s efforts in the 1984 essay, the attempt has 
seldom been repeated.   This chapter has sought to renew it. 
  Page 28 
 
Endnotes
1  I would like to thank this book’s editor, Stephen Whitefield, for his great 
indulgence towards my response to deadlines, and him and Archie Brown for helpful, 
insightful and encouraging comments on earlier drafts.  Remaining defects are 
entirely my responsibility. 
2 Recent examples of announcements of death and of rebirth are, respectively, 
Jackman and Miller, 1996a, 1996b, and Harrison and Huntington, 2000.   
3 One can indeed speak of ‘normalisation’ with some (though incomplete) 
reference to Kuhn’s notion of ‘normal science’, whose ‘puzzle-solving’ character he 
takes to demarcate scientific from other investigations (Kuhn, 1970, p.6).  To do this 
however begs the question of the ‘scientific’ status of political science (as much of the 
discipline in fact does).  Kuhn withholds this designation from most of the social 
sciences.  One might therefore speak of a ‘premature normalisation’, occurring before 
the full theoretical elaboration of a paradigm.  This implies premature science. 
4  The differences are variously substantive and methodological, a source of 
complexity that has not always been appreciated, as in the drastically oversimplified 
critical survey provided by Petro, 1995, pp.1–27. 
5  ‘Historical experience’ is a significantly ambiguous term.  It could refer to 
historical events and processes themselves; to popular knowledge and understanding 
of them as they unfold; or to the retrospective knowledge and understanding 
possessed perhaps generations later, in other words ‘historical memory’. 
6  Tucker’s complex position also contains a strand of psychoanalytical 
interpretation of Stalin and Stalinism.  The combination is analysed in Welch, 1996. 
7 An example would be Gleason’s (1995) attempt to explain the use of the 
totalitarian model in terms of Cold War political imperatives. 
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8 Wyman goes on to make a contrast with ‘oversimplified generalisations’ such 
as Almond and Verba’s ‘subject’ and ‘participant’ categories of political culture – yet 
these too were derived from surveys.  Surveys always have to be designed, and the 
results interpreted: the method itself is no protection against ‘oversimplification’. 
9 Terminological usage in political culture research has to be sure been 
somewhat unstable.  For example, Brown (2003, p.18) speaks of attitudes as ‘more 
malleable and ephemeral’ than ‘values, deep-lying beliefs and sense of identity’, 
while nevertheless devoting most of his survey of social psychological literature to 
attitudes and the attitude–behaviour relationship. Whatever the terminology, the 
question is whether political culture research has substantiated or even sufficiently 
examined its supposition of the ‘psychological depth’ of political culture.  A purely 
methodological response is to propose that political culture is that portion of 
measurable opinion/attitudes which changes slowly, as discovered by surveys.  This 
seems unsatisfactory in the absence of theoretical specification of the difference. 
10 A more radical extrapolation of Wilson’s findings has been made by 
philosopher of mind Stephen Stich (1983), who concludes from Wilson’s theory of 
dual attitudes: ‘In those cases where our verbal sub-system leads us to behave as 
though we believed some incompatible proposition, there will simply be no saying 
which we believe… And under those circumstances I am strongly inclined to think 
that the right thing to say is that there are no such things as beliefs’ (Stich, 1983, 
p.231, original emphasis). Wilson might well demur from that extrapolation, but he 
does agree that in such cases it is impossible to say what is the true attitude (Wilson et 
al., 2000).  Merely asking the subject, even under unconstrained conditions, is 
inconclusive. 
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